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The purpose of this thesis was to explore the changing perceptions of identity in 
relation to urbanity in Knoxville, Tennessee. The 1982 International Energy Exposition 
was the pivotal event in this study, a study that spanned roughly a century of Knoxville 
urbanization. This study was done through primary sources such as city plans, energy 
studies, and programs of city revitalization, restoration, and beautification. The primary 
sources used were then compared to traditional urban and environmental historiographies 
to establish a sense of where Knoxville fit in. 
The research revealed that Knoxville mirrored much of Southern trends in 
urbanization until 1982. The 1982 World's Fair represented a turning point in 
Knoxville's urbanization, at least in its theory. By hosting the fair, Knoxvillians hoped 
to capitalize on the nascent environmental movement by commodifying energy and 
nature. A direct response to the oil crisis of the 1970s, not to mention the struggling 
economy, the energy theme of the fair was an attempt to alleviate the national energy 
situation, while gaining recognition (and federal dollars) for the city of Knoxville. 
Much of the research centered upon the preceding planning of the fair, which 
revealed an intense conflict among the citizenry concerning the methods, motivations, and 
significance behind the fair. It is here that one sees two groups of elites battling over the 
future urban identity of their fair city. My study concluded that while the fair was a 
· practical failure, in that it accomplished few of the goals set out, it provided a startling 
glimpse into how urban identities are formed. In addition, the fair also disrupted the 
traditional pattern of city planning, and left in its wake privatized development. This 
legacy is still seen in the planning for the city of Knoxville for today. 
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INTRODUCTION 
"A lot of disbelief dies today with the birth of the first world's fair ever held in the 
Southeast--the 1982 World's Fair in Knoxville, Tennessee. "1 
The first of May heralded the opening of the 1982 International Energy 
Exposition. The exposition, the first of its kind in the southeastern United States, 
represented the fruition of the hopes of thousands of Knoxvillians. Conceived in 197 4, 
the idea for the fair stemmed from success stories of similar events in Seattle and 
Spokane. The fairs seemed to revive the central business districts of these cities and to 
spark a new era of urban renewal for the fair sites and surrounding areas. In theory, the 
fair offered everything Knoxvillians desired: international recognition, urban renewal, 
improved highways, increased commerce and employment, and, most importantly, the 
opportunity to present a progressive new identity to a national audience. 
Business on opening day fell within the projected range of eighty thousand to one 
hundred thousand. Even the weather, a mild seventy degrees, cooperated with the 
ambitions of the citizens of Knoxville. Fairgoers excitedly explored the Chinese pavilion, 
the amusement park rides, and the diverse range of eateries, among the many attractions 
that the fair offered. The rhetoric of harmony and unity, explicitly promoted by 
speakers such as Exposition chairman Jake Butcher, Mayor Randy Tyree, and President 
Ronald Reagan, espoused hope in a future of environmental sustainability and global 
1 Knoxville News-Sentinel, 2 May 1982. 
cooperation. By all standards, the opening day portended success for the exposition and 
the city.2 
Knoxville needed a success for a plethora of reasons. Some thirty-two million 
dollars of city funds were riding on this venture as Knoxville faced continuing urban 
decline. The fair was supposed to solve many problems. Knoxville had experienced 
increasing rates of suburbanization, severe racial and class stratification within city limits, 
and a slumping economy, trends that began in the 1920s and were well entrenched by the 
mid-1970s. Urban revitalization, a projected result of the Exposition, was to renew the 
central business district, spur urban growth, create more commerce and residency 
downtown, and in the end, render Knoxville the premier city of the South. Based on 
' . 
(somewhat inflated) stories of success in Seattle and Spokane, a fair seemed to offer a cure 
for these ills. Moreover, an international exposition presented a unique platform on 
which to create a new urban identity for the city of Knoxville. 
This platform became the theme of the fair. All international expositions 
celebrated a theme, and Knoxville's promoters trusted that an appropriate and 
provocative one would open new avenues for their city. Given the growth of the 
environmental movement and the oil crisis that defined the 1970s, the organizers focused 
on energy. The promoters hoped that through this theme, Knoxville would emerge as a 
progressive, attractive, flourishing city and leave its dingy reputation in the past. 
2 United States Department of Commerce, Final Report of the United States Commissioner 
General for the Knoxville Energy Exposition--Energy Expo '82--to the President of the United States 
(Washington D.C.: 1982), 1-10. 
In the preceding decades, many factors had contributed to Knoxville's less than 
progressive notoriety. Among them, Knoxville was a southern city. The concepts of 
the New South had improved the region's image, but few southern cities rivaled the 
metropolises of the Northeast, Midwest, and West. The South's distinct flavor remained 
colored by a history of Jim Crow segregation and retarded industrial development. 
Many prominent Knoxvillians wanted to escape such backward southern stereotypes. 
The theme of energy offered a chance to deliver Knoxville a new future. Promoters also 
focused on energy because of Knoxville's proximity to Oak Ridge National Atomic 
Laboratory (ORNL). The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), the largest power 
company in the Southeast, called the city home. And the University of Tennessee (UT), 
with its main Knoxville campus holding more than twenty-thousand students, was ·a 
leading institution for scientific research in related fields. Partnerships with these 
facilities gave legitimacy to Knoxville's claim to be an energy center, while the nearness of 
the Great Smoky Mountain National Park offered a link to "nature" in this new era of 
environmental consciousness. 
This particular vision was important. First, it allowed Knoxville to incorporate 
the more appealing aspects of such outlying areas into its own urban image. Knoxville 
had long competed with Oak Ridge for cultural and urban primacy in East Tennessee, and 
in recent decades had been fighting a losing battle. By hosting an energy-themed fair, 
Knoxville could claim, rhetorically, Oak Ridge's reputation as its own. The Great Smoky 
3 
Mountain National Park added another dimension. The city co-opted the park's image 
of protection and preservation and linked its urban environment with its "wilderness." 
As one of the country's largest power companies, TV A's activities were obviously 
associated with energy. However, by the 1970s, TV A's use of coal and nuclear power, 
the twin evils of energy, had damaged its reputation. TVA also relied on oil, and with 
the nationwide crisis, Americans had begun to question whether their dependence on 
foreign oil had created a threat to national security. By becoming the "green" city, 
Knoxville could dress itself and TV A in the cloth of environmentalism. 
Progressive notions associated with environmentalism were the chief reason for 
choosing the fair's theme. By celebrating more efficient energy usage and its implied 
relationship to environmentalism, Knoxville hoped to revamp its urban image. A 
connection to the ideals of 1970s environmentalism would distinguish the town from its 
southern neighbors and every other city in the country. .In the parlance of the 
exposition's rhetoric, Knoxville planned to lead the way in environmental sustainability. 
With the opening of the fair, all these ambitions seemed possible. The fact that 
the little city of Knoxville had pulled it off in the first place seemed to be a good start. 
The fair appeared to be a success. In many ways, certain urban visions were realized 
initially. The Lower Second Creek, the fair site, was restored and redeveloped, at least 
temporarily. Programs of city beautification improved the visual landscape of 
downtown. International symposia on energy convened there in the foothills of the 
4 
Smokies. The city began planning for new energy source studies and new integrated 
community. forums for energy. An International Energy Research Center was in the 
works, ensuring that Knoxville would remain at the forefront of energy technology once 
the Exposition closed. Residual development of the fair site promised increased 
commerce and upscale residency in the downtown district. Knoxville, it seemed, 
provided the new model for southern urban success, the embodiment of the modem, 
progressive city. 
Yet, when the fair closed six months later on October 3 1, 1982, hopes of lasting 
urban greatness seemed to vanish with the tourists. The 1982 World's Fair ultimately 
failed at all but two goals. First, the "scruffy little city" had hosted a successful fair that 
drew over eleven million visitors.3 Second, those visitors traveled to and from events 
on the new highways that looped the city. The remainder of the objectives never made 
it past the planning stage. Within fifteen years the Knoxville fair was chiefly 
remembered as the b·utt of a joke in a well-known episode of the animated television 
series, The Simpsons. What went wrong? The Simpsons simply and comedically 
captured the essence of the fair and its failure. In the episode, all that remains of the 
exposition is the Sunsphere, an empty relic of the grandiose and ultimately false promises 
made by the fair's promoters.4 
With the same forethought that Bart Simpson and his friends demonstrate when 
they decide to go to Knoxville for spring break, a small group of "developer-bloc" citizens 
3 Ibid., 5. 
4 
The Simpsons, Episode 720, archived at http://www.thesimpsons.com/episode-KtJide/. 
had brought the fair to Knoxville. Dynamic and aggressive, these organizers were the 
chief force behind the fair. In fact, they may have been the only ones completely behind 
it. Backers such as Kyle Testerman, Randy Tyree, Jake Butcher, and Stewart Evans 
seemingly single-handedly made the fair a reality. T-shirts proclaimed that "the scruffy 
little city did it," but Knoxville had hardly embraced the fair. In fact, most members of 
the community were never consulted about it. Other leading community members such 
as councilwoman Bernice O'Connor and Professor Joe Dodd raised loud voices of dissent. 
The Knoxville City Council had considered a referendum in 1978 to assess community 
support for'the fair, but a few connected members blocked the motion by labeling it un­
. American. · While a few Knoxvillians hoped the fair portended a better future for their 
community, they never reached a consensus about the Exposition's vision nor the path 
upon which it placed the city. 
The fair itself was not even formally endorsed by the citizens of Knoxville. The 
plans for post-fair residual development had no municipal complement; they lacked 
mechanisms for their implementation and enforcement. In addition, the temporary end to 
the oil crisis quickly undermined the importance of the energy theme in the 1980s and 
under the policies of the Reagan administration. Without an energy crisis most 
Knoxvillians, along with the rest of the nation, no longer felt compelled to create 
sustainable lifestyles nor a city that placed the environment ahead of economic issues. 
Finally, the inertia of the citizenry and the seeming enormity of the task of municipal 
6 
reform combined to stop Knoxvillians from making the urban vision of a few elites a 
reality. The World's Fair became a memory rather than a blueprint for the future. 
7 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE NASCENT BEGINNINGS OF URBAN IDENTITY: THE COMING OF THE 
FAIR 
Hosting a World's Fair was just the boost that Knoxville needed to keep it in pace with the 
times. 1 
The 1982 World's Fair in Knoxville stands out as a seeming aberration in the 
history of such expositions. A "scruffy little city," Knoxville seemed neither large 
enough, dynamic enough, nor progressive enough to host a world's fair. Yet Knoxville 
did. The Knoxville International Energy Exposition (KIEE) signified many things. 
Although the fair was a new idea, it represented a continuation of implementing short-
term, nonsustainable solutions for long-standing urban maladies. Knoxville had a recent 
history of urban decline and suburban flight and an even longer tradition of unstable 
development that failed to address the totality of the dty. Second, the solution the fair 
seemed to offer Knoxville suggested that the historical connotations of world's fairs and 
modernization still had meaning in contemporary society. Lastly, promoters of 
Knoxville's exposition grounded their hopes in misplaced urban theories that posited 
long-term revitalization followed short-term economic projects. 
In the end, the 1982 Knoxville World's Fair symbolized the culmination of the 
1 United States Department of Commerce, Final Report of the United States Commissioner 
General for the Knoxville International Energy Exposition -- Energy Expo '82 -- to the President 
of the United States (Washington D.C.: 1982), 1. 
city's century-long struggle for an urban identity. The close of the Civil War yielded, 
among other things, the idea of the New South. Its proponents urged an immediate shift 
toward greater urbanization, although support for this notion did not reach its peak until 
the 1930s. Some southern cities experienced growth, but the region still lagged behind 
others in industrialization, per capita income, and the sophisticated accouterments 
associated with large metropolises.2 Some southerners hoped that the cultural and 
industrial differences between the North and South, still evident in the 1930s, were 
merely a result of time. An increasingly more expansive urbanization of the South, they 
believed, would close the gap. Urban leaders across the region contended that if cities 
built infras�ctures, industry would follow. From these advancements, modernization 
would result, with all the cultural and social changes it implied. 
This theory had at its heart the premise that centrality of cities in cultural and 
economic life was a nationally shared idea. While this shared concept of urbanity had 
definite characteristics, cities were not all alike. Models of urbanization distinguished , 
between the eastern and western city, and until recently the southern model of 
urbanization fell under the paradigm of the Eastern/Northern model. Scholars of the late 
twentieth century, such as David R. Goldfield, contest this classification, arguing that the 
South constitutes a distinctive regional framework that takes into consideration factors 
such as "ruralism, race, and colonialism. "3 This framework sets the cities of the South 
2 David R. Goldfield, "The Urban South: A Regional Framework," The· American Historical 
Review 86 (December 198 1 ): 1009- 10 1 1. 
3 Ibid., 10 1 1. 
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apart from both their eastern and western counterparts. 
Historians such as Louis Wirth assert that the city is a separate entity, much 
removed from its rural counterpart. A city possesses the power to alter a way of life.4 
In keeping with traditional theory, this assertion rests on the foundation that urbanity 
represents a unique community-a community that exists across all regions. This 
tradition supports the theory that cities are first built, then inhabited and infused with 
life. This supposition removes agency from the diverse groups of peoples that truly 
create cities. This idea of city gives primacy to the superstructure of urbanization rather 
than to the actual agents of urbanity. While not necessarily erroneous, this tradition 
presents a rather lopsided view of urbanization. 5 
Goldfield' s regional framework for the South does not consider the southern 
city to be part of such an urban community. Nor does Goldfield work with an 
assumption of a distinct line between the rural and the urban. Rather, Goldfield argues 
that in the South, the agency of urbanity was not so powerful. Instead of southern cities 
absorbing and effectively subduing notions, values, and traditions associated with 
ruralism, they repeatedly contended with them over time. Competing notions of traditio_n 
(rural) and modernity (urban) maintained equal primacy in the urban South. Goldfield 
argues for a separate framework because the "dissociation of city and region" is less 
apparent in the South than in other urban models.6 
4 Louis Wirth, cited in Goldfield, "The Urban South," 1010. 
5 Jane Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities (New York: Vintage, 1961), 3-25. 
6 Goldfield, "The Urban South," 1010. 
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Goldfield is certainly not the only one to stress the centrality of the 
relation between region and city. Few scholars see city and country as entirely 
dichotomous entities, but the interchange between urban and rural has been less distinct in 
southern towns. The South's tradition of agriculture, its economic dependence on 
northern industry, and its complicated racial past render the South as distinct a region as 
the North and the West.7 This distinct past made the southern city unique. 
Knoxville, Tennessee fits this pattern. The city grappled with its urban 
identity within this southern urban framework. Alternately proud and ashamed of their 
town's semi-urban status and Appalachian roots, Knoxvillians had a long, troubled 
romance with traditional views of urbanization. This past, plagued by fragmentation, 
dissent, and uncertainty, culminated in the hosting of the 1982 World's Fai�. The Fair, 
and the decade leading up to it, were turning points in Knoxville's history of urbanization.· 
A.cyclic pattern of failed applications of traditional urban planning efforts and theory and 
periods of stagnation plagued the city. The World's Fair, one of the latest attempts at 
traditional modernization, was but one event in·this pattern. The fair, although a new 
idea, was essentially an old solution. 
The history of urbanization in Knoxville generally begins in the late nineteenth 
century. In the wake of the Civil War, the fever of the New South spread throughout the 
region. Knoxville was no exception. The modest town, which had undergone several · 
7 Ibid., 10 10- 1034. 
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changes since its founding in 1791, started on the road to industrialization through its 
leading citizens. "A close-knit civic commercial elite" began to imagine a modem 
Knoxville that combined the area's abundant natural resources and an established rail 
system with outside capital (mostly from the North) and labor from outlying districts. 
This Appalachian hinterland teemed with a seemingly inexhaustible supply of workers to 
fuel the industrialization of Knoxville. These workers also infused Knoxville with rural 
values, traditions, and conservatism. According to Michael McDonald and William Bruce 
Wheeler, the association with its Appalachian hinterland provided the aspects of ruralism 
and racism that are part of Goldfield' s framework. 8 
For McDonald and Wheeler, "Appalachia" refers generally to "an 
environment that is premodem or transitional--an environment of rurality, strong kinship 
ties, community, low social mobility, resistance to change, self-awareness [ of said 
characteristics], and deep personal religious conviction." This "premodem or 
transitional" element, present in many southern cities, was absorbed to a higher degree in 
Knoxville because urbanization remained a fragmented, unstable, incomplete process.9 
Thus the city lacked the necessary urbanity to dilute the Appalachian element. 
Essentially, Knoxville became urban, but not urban enough. Not only did the New South 
come to Appalachia, Appalachia came to the New South. 10 This feature of Knoxville 
8 Micheal J. McDonald and William Bruce Wheeler, Knoxville, Tennessee: Continuity and 
Change in an Appalachian City (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983), 1 1. 
9 Ibid. 
1° C. Vann Woodward, Origins of the New South, 1877- 19 13 (Louisiana: Louisiana University 
Press, 1951): 15 1. 
13 
defined its century-long struggle for modernization. 
In the late nineteenth century, a new ruling constituency of middle-class 
businessmen who resembled urban societies of the East and-West began to dominate 
Knoxville. Before the Civil War, Knoxville did not reflect common societal patterns of 
the South. However, postwar Knoxville's industrialization was similar to other southern 
attempts at the same. In order to attract northern capital, these businessmen suppressed 
dissenting groups such as the displaced aristocracy, blacks, and white yeomen; this 
suppression required tightly controlled planning. 1 1  Trading boards and industrial 
associations· were set up, artd northern dollars flowed in. This outside capital provided 
the economic dependence that Goldfield terms colonialism. 1 2  Population growth 
accompanied these investments. Coupled with the rail system and the ideologically 
homogeneous ruling elite, Knoxville was building an industrial basis -for continued growth. 
The type of migrants influenced the direction Knoxville pursued. To be sure: 
investors and merchants came to Knoxville, but the majority of the population influx 
consisted of newly-freed blacks and Appalachian whites. The new iron mills, coal 
companies, cloth mills, machine factories, marble companies, and furniture manufacturers 
required large numbers of primarily unskilled laborers. This industrial sector largely 
comprised what became known as the ol� downtown core along the river. Workers of all 
socioeconomic classes intermingled in the neighborhoods ringing the core. 1 3 Th�se trends, 
1 1  McDonald and Wheeler, Knoxville. Tennessee, 1 6. 
12 Goldfield, "The Urban South," 1034. 
13 McDonald and Wheeler, Knoxville. Tennessee, 18-24. 
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coupled with the annexations of Mechanicsville and Fort Sanders, resulted in the rapid 
urbanization of the once sleepy little town. The booming industrialization meant many 
things to the emerging city. Knoxville's path to urbanization resulted in a surprisingly 
diverse downtown. Racially and economically heterogeneous neighborhoods sprung up 
overnight. Diversity proved a double-edged sword, resulting in both rapid adjustment to 
urban life and engendering a suspicion of it as well. Blacks and Appalachian whites made 
Knoxville their own. This new Knoxville meant different things for different people. 
These demographic shifts affected more than the population and cultural 
landscape of Knoxville. The physical features of Knoxville rapidly changed as well. 
Factories brought dust, soot, and other forms of pollution that altered their immediate 
neighborhoods and more distant parts of Knoxville. The industry brought infrastructural 
improvements to its immediate vicinity, but these benefits did not reach the rest of the 
city. Paved roads outside of the immediate downtown area were scarce. Sewage systems 
were virtually nonexistent. Animals roamed dirt streets so unhygienic that they acted as 
conduits for disease. By _1920 the physical degradation of the city of Knoxville prompted 
the exodus of those who could afford to leave. This beginning of Knoxville's suburban 
sprawl undermined the growing urban diversity as well. Neighborhoods became 
economically and racially segregated, a trend that only intensified over the decades. 1 4  
The phenomenon of actually leaving the city they helped to create distanced 
local elites from the consequences of industrial growth in Knoxville as well . Short-term 
14 Ibid., 24-35. 
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solutions to industrial problems were favored over long-term ideas because of their 
immediate economic benefits and lower costs. Because those who fled were no longer 
part of the downtown, they no longer could see the advantages of permanently improving 
it. Gradually, the spirit and motivation that characterized Knoxville 's  initial growth 
spurt ground to a halt. As a result of neglect, the downtown neighborhoods and factories 
fell into greater disrepair, exacerbating the already tense atmosphere between the poor 
blacks and poor whites. In Knoxville, the boosterism of the New South proved merely 
rhetorical. By 1920, "physical grimness, economic slowdown, modest population 
growth, residential segregation by class, and race, the growing conservatism of a large 
segment of the elite, and racial problems together signaled that if the New South had 
• arrived in Knoxville, the benefits it brought to the city clearly had been mixed." In 
addition to these problems, Knoxville's nascent city government did no� have a clear role 
to play in addressing these ailments. Bitter political rifts forced those who might pose 
solutions to remain out of the line of fire. Conservative politics and an unwillingness to 
raise taxes for municipal spending caused Knoxvilie to become the most indebted city in 
.Tennessee. This indebtedness compounded the already severe problems caused by 
ineffective urbanization. 1 5  
Although past its heyday, the City Beautiful movement still exerted a pull on 
city planning, influencing the image of the "city" in the American imagination. Physical 
revitalization, aesthetics, order, and harmony between nature and the city became the 
15 Ibid., 34-4 1, quotation on 41. 
16 
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lasting legacies of the City Beautiful movement and seemed to provide remedies to some 
urban problems. 1 6  But such solutions were beyond Knoxville's already strained 
finances. Private developers remained unwilling to invest in the downtown area, due to 
the high risk of such ventures, but business boomed in the suburbs. This concentration of 
activity intensified the suburban flight and further condemned the downtown, home to 
poor whites and blacks. Poverty exacerbated antagonistic race relations in the densely 
populated downtown. 1 7  A seemingly progressive industrial city at the turn of the 
century, Knoxville continued a downward spiral of cultural fragmentation that lasted well 
into the 1940s. The city fell prey to the conservatism, colonialism, and racism embedded 
in Goldfield's southern urban framework. It took decades before any of these aspects 
could be completely overcome. Knoxville was not alone. At this time, other older 
industrial centers in the region experienced depopulation and economic stagnation. 
African-Americans fled to the North well into the 1970s, disrupting Knoxville's previous 
pattern of diversity. What little diversity still existed stayed in downtown. 1 8  
After World War II  Knoxville shared in the national and southern trend of 
postwar prosperity, and even started minor movements towards urban revitalization. 
Interstate highway construction, the Knoxville Utilities Board, and an airport, appeared in 
this period. Superficially, "Knoxville [was] poised on the brink of a new era of 
16 William H. Wilson, The City Beautiful Movement (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1989): 1-9. 
11 McDonald and Wheeler, Knoxville, Tennessee, 48. 
18 Ibid. , 70-72. 
1 7  
development."1 9  The reality was strikingly different. Textile industries declined, and 
newer. industries could not replace their primacy. Furthermore, Knoxville's crumbling 
infrastructure, a feature since the beginning of its industrial movement, grew rapidly 
worse. By 1949 about 45 percent of downtown buildings either needed major repairs 
or faced condemnation. Municipal administrations saw no incentive to improve the old 
downtown, and this lack of improvement caused further suburban flight. The postwar 
political scene was no more prepared to deal with such a blighted industrial sector than 
before. To make matters worse, the prosperous, emerging town of Oak Ridge seemed 
ready to usurp Knoxville's place atop the urban hierarchy of East Tennessee. Unable to 
decide between resentment of Oak Ridge or co-opting its reputation, Knoxvillians 
remained wary of their atomic neighbor. This tumultuous state of affairs in Knoxville 
continued until the mid 1970s.20· •  
In the 1960s, however, some sentiment toward urban revitalization had 
surfaced. For example, the Market Square development was a well-intentioned failure at 
reclaiming Knoxville's urban center. Market Square was redesigned to include more 
parking and to look more attractive in an effort to bring shoppers back to the downtown. 
Although the new square attracted some initial interest, downtown ultimately could not 
compete with the space and variety that suburban shopping plazas offered. Attempts 
such as Market Square, although they did help to beautify the downtown to a degree, did 
19 Ibid., 72. 
20 Ibid. 
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nothing to stop the economic decline of the area. These initial attempts foreshadowed a 
flurry of ideas in the 1970s and 1980s from new political blood. "Developer-bloc" 
politicians such as Kyle Testerman and Randy Tyree determined to drag Knoxville into 
twentieth-century modernization kicking and screaming if they had to. Stubbornly 
ignoring the traditional conservative powers, these new politicians and civic leaders "saw 
their task as nothing less than bold planning for area growth and massive renovation of 
downtown." Aided by the Butcher brothers and the Lawler developers, these men 
sought to change Knoxville. This new civic spirit, coupled with a growing university 
population and hopes for increases in industry, yielded ideas such as Expo '82.2 1  
For the new power brokers, Expo ' 82 was an important step in addressing 
Knoxville' s long-entrenched problems. Although Expo '82 was a new idea for Knoxville, 
it was an historically old solution. World expositions had served as catalysts for 
urbanization in other cities. However, Expo '82 proved to be no more lasting than any 
earlier revitalization efforts in Knoxville. In the end, the fair launched a new and equally 
misplaced preoccupation with satellite zones and selective renewal. 
On September 30, 1 974, W. Stewart Evans, the president of the Downtown 
Knoxville Association, attended an international conference in Tulsa, Oklahoma and heard 
a favorable report about Expo '74, the World's· Fair held in Spokane, Washington. Within 
a mon�h, he presented his idea to hold one in Knoxville to the Downtown Knoxville 
2 1 Ibid., 1 19- 1 68, quotation on 1 19. 
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Association, a group of leading members of the business community. In less than a year, 
Mayor Kyle Testerman appointed an advisory committee. A year later, the committee 
chose the fair site. Eleven developers incorporated the Knoxville International Energy 
Exposition Corporation and began raising funds for the appropriation of the site.22 
Why did an idea like an international exposition take hold among the new 
Knoxville visionaries? There were many reasons. Recent fairs such as those in Spokane 
and Seattle yielded seemingly positive results. Seattle and Spokane's promoters boasted 
of the urban and economic growth that resulted from their expositions. Historically, fairs 
placed a spotlight on America and its larger cities -- St. Louis, Chicago, New York-- for 
the rest of the world. A world's fair in Knoxville seemingly promised similar results. 
Also, an international theme of environmen�alism for the fair could reverse what had 
formerly been seen as some of Knoxville 's problems. In the ideology of the fair's 
planners, competing areas such as the Smoky Mountains and Oak Ridge would be 
intellectually annexed to Knoxville. TV A could be redressed in the clothes of 
environmentalism by emphasizing energy over pollution. 
Merle Curti points out that American world fair participation was fueled 
chiefly by the desires to expand American "patriotism and enterprise." Past motives 
for American participation in overseas fairs and for hosting fairs on American soil were to 
exhibit the nation's resources, industrial prowess, social values and institutions, and 
22 United States Department of Commerce, Final Report of the United States Commissioner 
General for the Knoxville International Energy Exposition -- Energy Expo '82 -- to the President 
of the United States (Washington D.C. : 1982), 1. 
20 
economic largess and to dispel notions of American inferiority. International expositions 
were "good advertising to attract European skilled immigrants and capital, to increase 
American exports, to publicize American institutions, and enhance American prestige." 
Desires for global harmony and a diffusion of technology permeated later fairs. Knoxville 
promoters' reasoning for hosting a fair was well-informed by this tradition.23 
More recent fairs also established specific examples for Knoxville's 
undertaking. The Seattle and Spokane fairs, along with the San Antonio exposition, most 
closely resembled Knoxville's effort. It could hardly be otherwise; after all, how could 
Knoxville's Expo rival those of established urban centers such as Chicago or New York? 
Seattle's Century 2 1  Exposition of 1962 had begun a shift toward smaller exhibitions for 
world's fairs. Designed to showcase local and regional distinctions, these expositions 
promoted these cities nationally and internationally and often resulted in the bonus of 
urban renewal. Seattle's fair celebrated achievements in science and space and projected 
life in the twenty-first century city. The exposition was a local event, but it included 
national and international messages concerning the atomic and space ages, global harmony, 
and even a lessening of Cold War tensions that highlighted Seattle as an emerging western 
metropolis.24 The fair established Seattle as a new breed of a western city where 
topography and isolation still yielded an urban center. Seattle's World's Fair attempted 
23 Merle Curti, "America at the World fairs, 1851-1893," The American Historical 
Review 55 (July 1950): 833-836, quotations on 833 and 836, respectively. 
24 John M. Findlay, Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture After 1940 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 214-216. 
21 
to bring the economic focus back to the city center. The central city was revitalized and 
enlarged, in effect bringing suburbanites back to the core. Other benefits of the fair 
included the completion of a mass-transit monorail, increased pedestrian access, and 
downtown beautification. Spokane's 197 4 fair was similar to the Seattle experience. Its 
organizers developed a theme that addressed the endangered environment. A successful 
springboard for urban renewal, this fair ignited similar hopes for Knoxville. 25 
Knoxville's decision to host a world's fair is easily divined from these 
examples. On a smaller scale, Knoxvillians brought very similar motivations to their 
exposition. They hoped to attract outside capital and dispel local and national notions of 
the city's inferiority. Also the fair provided Knoxville with the opportunity to unite 
wi(h O.ak Ridge and the Smoky Mountains �n creating a regional identity. By using the 
theme of energy, a theme that hid behind assumed connections wit.h environmentalism and 
conservation, Knoxville could display to the world that it was urbane and progressive. 
Promoters hoped to suggest that Knoxville was more connected with the conservation of 
energy than the pollution of its production and expenditure, allowing the city and it 
citizens to seem concerned about the earth. The fair, they believed, would generate fifty 
years of progress in five years. 26 
The propaganda made the fair seem like an attractive option. Promoters 
promised everything; the exposition was the solution for all of Knoxville's ills. Second 
25 Ibid. ,  214-255 .  
26 Joe Dodd, Expose: The Real Story Behind the Knoxville 's  World's  Fair (Knoxville: Joe Dodd, 
1982), 1 .  
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Creek, a deteriorated and stagnant area between the university and downtown, was to be 
restored and enlarged. 27 · The fair would eliminate "visual blight and deteriorating 
structures . . .  while providing . . .  a major city park, a permanent Energy Research Center, 
new housing, industrial sites, and a cross-town transit system. "28 Supporters touted the 
revitalization of Fort Sanders, a neighborhood adjacent to the fair site. Another lure was 
an increase in tourism to Knoxville that promised to last beyond 1982. 29 
As early as November 1976, the Knoxville International Energy Exposition 
Corporation outlined its main objectives. Drawn from local businessmen and developers, 
its members included Jake Butcher, a banker, Rodney Lawler, a contractor, and James 
Haslam II, president of Pilot Oil Company.Jo At the top of their list were improved 
highways to facilitate fair accessibility and downtown access afterward. They also called 
for urban integration-uniting the downtown, Second Creek, Fort Sanders, and university 
districts. Integration would involve creating green areas that linked the city center and 
these other areas. A major tenet of the promoters' plan was the creation of permanent 
structures reserve4 for city use after the fair that would attract patrons to the revitalized 
downtown district. Lastly, beautification and increased downtown parking were 
promised results of the fair.J i  The fair as the catalyst of urban renewal became the banner 
21 The Knoxville Journal, 22 March 1977. 
28 U.S. Department of Commerce, Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Knoxville International 
Energy Exposition (Spokane, Washington, 1976):i. 
29 The Knoxville Journal, 17 October 1978; 27 April 1977. 
30 U.S. Department of Commerce, Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Knoxville International 
Energy Exposition (Spokane, Washington, 1976): 11. 
31 Ibid. ,  7; Knoxville News-Sentinel, 10 November 1976. 
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of its supporters. A ''vehicle for honest-to-goodness rehabilitation," the exposition 
would make Knoxville a "real" city with a developed downtown, a thriving economy, and 
an urbane image.32 In surveys taken in 1980, Knoxvillians simply parroted the fair 
promoters. When graduate student Oliver Thomas Massey, Jr surveyed citizens about 
what was important, their answers invariably included, "improved community spirit, 
downtown revitalization, more and better jobs, recognition of the town, improved mass 
transit, increased business, more public entertainment, increased tourism, and increased 
land values."33 How could Knoxville's residents resist such promises? "Soon [Knoxville] 
would be a city with super services, an expanded tax base, a united and wealthy people, 
and W()rldwide recognition as the energy capital of the world. "34 With such . 
. endorseiµents, �he fair seemed _attractive indeed. 
In addition, the fair's energy theme niad�_K.noxville an environmental city, one 
concerned with the international context of the environmental crisis. The environmental 
movement had taken on a sense of urgency, in part, as a result of the 1970s oil crisis. 
This fair, with its emphasis on environmental technology and global harmony, would 
dispel the notion that Knoxville was simply a "scruffy little city." Obviously, the hopes 
of Knoxvillians differed little from those who had hosted earlier fairs. The International 
32 Knoxville News-Sentinel, 29 May 1977. 
33 Oliver Thomas Massey, "An Application of Diffusion of lnnovation Theory in the Analysis of 
Attitudes Toward the 1982 World 's Energy Exposition" (Ph.D. diss., University of tennessee, 
1982), 82. Also see Gregory J. Meissen, "A Differential Analysis of the Perceived Social Impact 
of a World's  Exposition" (Ph.D. diss., University of Tennessee, 1980), 77. 
34 Joe Dodd, World Class Politics :  Knoxville's 1982 World 's  Fair Redevelopment and Political 
Process (Salem: Sheffield Publishing Company, 1988), 1 15. 
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Energy Exposition of 1 982 was simply a bid to show the world a better city. Knoxville 's 
success would also be the South's triumph, as the exposition dispelled stereotypes of it 
own dinginess in particular and southern backwardness in general. Knoxville would 
emerge as the urban leader of the South. 
The theme of energy provided a platform for the fair and allowed Knoxville to 
capitalize on the achievements of its neighbors. Associations with TV A and ORNL 
shifted from energy use to energy technology and conservation. In addition, Knoxville 's 
proximity to the Great Smoky Mountains National Park also connected the city to a 
provocative natural image. By implication, boosters tied energy and nature with 
environmentalism. This implication allowed Knoxville to present itself as a progressive 
city as well as the one that was protective of its surrounding beautiful environment. 
The environmental movement of the 1 970s had its roots in the politics of the 
1 960s when greater affluence allowed Americans to ponder air and water quality and to 
support the National Environmental Policy Act of 1 969.3 5  The oil crisis of the 1 970s 
alerted Americans that their wasteful habits had created a dependence on foreign oil. 36 
By the 1970s, environmentalism had become a house�old word, if not a household 
practice. President Lyndon B .  Johnson's administration had begun to address urban 
environmental concerns in programs such as Ladybird Johnson's "Keep America 
35 Hal K. Rothman, The Greening of A Nation? Environmentalism in the United States Since 
1945 (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1998), 1 15. 
3 6  New York Times, 2 May 1 982. 
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Beautiful" campaigns and the city beautification project for Washington, D.C.37 
Environmentalists had moved beyond concerns for the wilderness to take on the city. 
Martin V. Melosi explains that in the 1970s the "natural environment and the built 
environment were being fused in the national consciousness, possibly for the first time. "38 
The growing prominence of environmentalism in the national consciousness fit 
the progression of fair themes, from science and space in Seattle, to the endangered 
environment of Spokane, to "energy turns the world" in Knoxville. Promoters 
considered Knoxville a "primary U.S. energy center."39 Promoters argued that because of 
the university, the presence of TVA, and Knoxville's proximity to the Great Smoky 
Mountains Park and Oak Ridge, the city was a natural choice for such a .fair. 
The theme -- energy turns the world -- presented a variety of options about 
the meaning and application of energy. . The exposition was an opportunity to offer an 
environmental ethic to the citizens of the world.40 Explaining how energy was used and 
how it could be used better became a major objective.41  The fair would show the 
shocking state of energy waste worldwide and provide alternative solutions to those 
37 Rothman, The Greening of a Nation?, 96-98. 
38 Martin V. Melosi, Effluent America: Cities, Industry, and the Environment (Pittsbl/trgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 254-257. I 
39 United States Department of Commerce, Final Report of the United States Commissioner 
General for the Knoxville International Energy Exposition -- Energy Expo '82 -- to the President 
of the United States (Washington D.C. : 1982), 3;5. 
40 United States Department of Commerce, Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Knoxville 
International Energy Exposition (Spokane, Washington, 1976): 17. 
41 United States Department of Commerce, Final Report of the United States Commissioner 
General for the Knoxville International Energy Exposition -- Energy Expo '82 -- to the President 
of the United States (Washington D.C.: 1982), 3. 
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problems. Future technology would dominate the exhibits.42 These solutions would 
insure that fairgoers left with a sense of hope.43 Promoters also planned to celebrate the 
creative energy of people, especially the energy of Knoxvillians.44 In addition to the 
Exposition, the city of Knoxville would become greener through a complex plan of city 
landscaping. 45 
The notion that Knoxville would strive for urban sustainability, although 
relevant to its time and place, was not entirely plausible. Knoxville was an energy 
capital, but local entities such as TVA focused more·on production at any cost than 
conservation practices. In reality, the fair addressed some aspects of environmentalism, 
such as the pursuit for alternative fuel sources, but the vague theme of energy attached 
itself to the coattails of environmentalism and mistaken assumptions about Knoxville's 
progressiveness. 
The propaganda of the fair projected assurance and organization, but the 
reality was less certain. Community support was neither widespread nor deep. The 
fair happened in large part due to the sheer will of a few community leaders, such as 
Butcher, Roberts, Testerman, and others. This will, sadly, was only manifested by key 
members on either side of the fair debate. Initially, they argued, the fair would cost the 
citizens of Knoxville nothing. They maintained this assurance until shortly after the fair 
42 Economics Research Corporation, Economic Feasibility of Energy Expo '82 (Knoxville, 
Tennessee, 19781 1-11. 
43 United States Department of Commerce, Supplement to the Final Environmental Impact 
Statement (Spokane, Washington, 1977), 13. 
44 Kncxville News-Sentinel, 29 April 1977. 
45 Ibid. ,  4 May 1977. 
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closed. In pre-fair rhetoric, details about funding, redevelopment, and the environmental 
consequences of new development lacked specificity. For example, comments to the 
Environmental Impact Statement revealed that a great deal of construction and site 
planning left many questions unanswered. Other points of contention, explained more 
thoroughly in chapter two, included concerns about parking, housing and relocation and 
questions alluding to the true beneficiaries of the fair. The dissenters were convinced that 
the fair would only intensify the city's existing maladie�. Both sides worried about 
rebuilding, revitalizing, and renewing the downtown core. They simply did not agree on 
how these goals should be achieved. 
Poor planning became the springboard for dissension. The cavalier manner in 
· · which the fair was approved, planned, and even executed spurred many citizens to take 
· action. Most citizens felt left out of the fair's planning process. After the DKA 
proposed the _initial idea in 1974, Mayor Testerman appointed an advisory committee to 
study the fair's feasibility, but what was to be a study became reality, and by 1975 a 
both a theme and a site had been proposed. Immediately thereafter, the advisory 
committee incorporated into the KIEE and began raising funds for the venture. KIEE 
projected expenses of $ 11.6 million dollars. Approval came in 1976, largely due to the 
timely nature of the theme. After the Bureau of International Exposition approved the 
venue, the federal government pledged $20.6 million to build the U.S. Pavilion. The city 
provided $11.6 million, from loans and pledges, to match federal funding. The state 
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contributed $3 million, to supplement $ 12.5 million of federal funds allocated for 
interstate construction. This left more than $60 million to be picked up locally. The 
budget had swelled considerably. Shut out of a referendum, citizens were forced to pay 
for a venture that had been masterminded by just a few.46 
Funding garnered criticism concerning the ultimate benefits of the fair. Many 
feared that the fair, paid for by many, would benefit only a few--Jake and C.H. Butcher, 
the chief financiers for the fair, and their associates, former mayor Kyle Testerman and 
current mayor Randy Tyree, who took office in 1980. Indeed, the politics that secured 
the approval and funding of the fair were sordid at best. The Butcher brothers stood to 
gain the most through rising property values and interest rates. According to fair rhetoric, 
the exposition was a not-for-profit venture. Be that as it may, a great deal of downtown 
properties were owned by KIEE members. In addition, various downtown firms,' such as 
Rodney Lawler's development and contracting company, and the Butcher Brothers ' 
banks stood to gain from opportunities presented in the course of the fair' s financing and 
construction. Critics alleged that promoters generally, and the Butcher brothers 
specifically, were "raiding the treasury.'"'1 National coverage from the Reader 's Digest, 
the New York Times, and other publications was generally unfavorable. The Reader 's 
Digest averred that the Expo was "born of sorgi_�_p_olitics at the highest levels . . .  this 
-
-
46 United States Department of Commerce, Final Report of the United States Commissioner 
General for the Knoxville International Energy Exposition -- Energy Expo '82 -- to the President 
of the United States (Washington D.C., 1982): 10 . 
47 Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, "The Shocking Saga of Expo '82," Reader 's Digest 691 (November 
1979): 170. 
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project is a gross example of the kind of pork-barrel spending the president promised to 
abolish."48 As late as 1981, long after construction had begun, the New York Times 
expressed doubts that Knoxville could pull off the fair.49 While such articles confirmed 
the opposition's worst fears, supporters perceived them as merely ignorant slurs that 
motivated them to complete the fair as promised. 
Initially, $ 1 1.6 million was the cost for the fair. This money, taken from city 
funds, complemented a $20.6 million pledged by the federal government. However, 
promoters initially claimed no city funding was necessary. Knoxville's rising debt had 
reached its saturation point years before; Tyree and other city leaders approved more 
only because they assumed that future profits would cover all of Knoxville's debt.50 
The allocation of city funds sparked a dissenting movement for a referendum 
regarding Expo '82 in 1977. Led by community groups, such as the Knoxville Area 
Urban League, and citizens, such as Professor Joe Dodd and City Councilwoman Bemi_ce 
O' Connor, the referendum was designed to gauge how much actual support the fair 
enjoyed from the community. Because of the vagueness surrounding the costs and the 
beneficiaries of the fair, the referendum was seen as a corrective to both the hype and the 
promoters of the fair. The explanations about funding remained unclear, particularly 
when another $25 million was borrowed, by the city, from local banks, and never really 
48 Ibid., 1 69. 
49 New York Times, 30 May 198 1. 
50 The Knoxville Journal, 18 October 1978. 
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explained to the public who would be repaid_s , Allegations sprung up concerning another 
$ 10  million that were supposedly secretly pledged by Mayor Randy Tyree and not 
disclosed.s2 Rumors like these, regardless of their validity, caused alarm among many_of 
the city's citizens about false publicity and the mishandling of public funds. Citing 
examples such as Spokane's success and speculating on the revenues of the fair, 
Knoxville's promoters promised large-scale benefits of economic activity and urban 
redevelopment, but they never committed to concrete redevelopment plans for post-fair 
Knoxville, and rarely informed the public about the true financial nature of their 
undertaking.s3 The referendum was pushed to alleviate these problems but was blocked 
by key members of the City Council and KIEE, such as Rodney Lawler. In the end, the 
referendum was struck down on the basis of its ''un-American" nature.s4 
Sloppy handling of public information led to the formation of a small, but 
extremely vocal group of citizens who, vehemently opposed the fair. The dissenters did 
· their homework. Joe Dod�, a political science professor at the University of Tennessee, 
and Bernice O'Connor, a city councilwoman, organized most of the local opposition.55 
Publications, such as the Knoxville Area Urban League's "An Assessment of Socio-
Economic Problems Likely to Result From the Proposed Knoxville International Energy 
Exposition," intelligently probed the planning's inconsistencies and failings, but to no 
51 Ibid., 17 October 1978.  
5 2  Ibid., 4 October 1978. 
53  Ibid., 22 March 1977. 
54 Ibid. ss Ibid., 17 October 1978; 18 October 1978. 
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avail. The Urban League challenged the long-term effects of the construction, the methods 
of revitalization, and the plan for a rebuilt watershed. The work also pointed out that the 
alleged benefits were speculative in nature and poorly researched. Moreover, the study 
questioned the efficacy of a plan that did not involve the input of the citizenry. The 
work also addressed glaring errors present in the EIS.56 These and other criticisms were 
never really addressed by the fair's advisory board, because it was not required to do so 
under the law.57 
Clearly, it is easy to see, from both sides of the fair debate that essentially 
two groups of elites were clashing .concerning the future of their community. Though 
polled citizens certainly supported growth and its attendant positives, the mass citizenry 
of Knoxville were left el)tirely out of the process. Educated and well placed citizens such 
as Joe Dodd and Councilwoman Bernice O'Connor led the opposition against the other 
elite faction, the developer-bloc group. The developer-bloc men prevailed. 
The striking down of the referendum, completely overriding the concerns of 
opposed citizens was essentially the end to any effective opposition. 58 Opposing views 
still rang out at city council meetings and in editorial pages, but critics could not stop the 
fair. In the end, nothing could stop the fair. 
56 Knoxville Area Urban League, "An Assessme�t of Socio-Economic Problems Likely to Result 
from the Proposed Knoxville International Energy Exposition," (Knoxville, Tennessee, 1977): 1-
4. 
57 United States Department of Commerce, Comments and Responses to the Supplement to the 
Final Environmental Impact Statement (Spokane, Washington, 1979). 
58 The Knoxville Journal, 22 March 1977. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A LACK OF WILL: KNOXVILLE, ENERGY, AND DEVELOPMENT 
"We realized that energy would be the most important subject that anybody could 
discussed at any time, at any place for the rest of the century. "1 
In 1973, OPEC's oil embargo precipitated a crisis in tlie United States and raised a 
new awareness of energy issues. Americans realized that reliance on foreign resources 
constituted an unstable dependency at best and posed a danger to the American way of 
life at worst. In 1979, President Jimmy Carter asserted, in an address to the nation on 
energy, that the crisis had eroded Americans' confidence in their future and undermined 
the "social and political fabric of America. "2 The crisis had indeed changed the way 
Americans perceived energy and its place in their future. This connection was no longer 
positive. Before the 1 970s, most Americans had enjoyed the seemingly infinite 
abundance afforded by the the American landscape. A new consciousness now 
recognized the finite nature of energy resources and raised the issue of sustainability. 
Dependence on foreign oil was not the only issue. People recognized that energy was 
connected to population growth, economic viability, and the balance of political power 
1 Spoken by Stewart Evans, president of Downtown Knoxville Association. Department of 
Commerce, Final Report of the United States Commissioner General for the Knoxville International 
Energy Exposition-Energy Expo '82-to the President of the United States (Washington D.C., 1982): 9. 
2 President James Earl Carter, "Address to the Nation on Energy and National Goals," July 15, 
1979, quoted in Jeanne Nienaber Clarke and Hanna J. Cortner, eds., The State and Nature: Voices Heard, 
Voices Unheard in America's Environmental Dialogue (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2002), 286. 
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within the global community. 
Traditionally Americans had turned to technology to resolve such crises. While 
faith in technical solutions continued, environmentalists asked their fellow citizens to 
consider conservation and alternative fuels as part of this new energy consciousness. A 
maturing American environmentalism had moved beyond wilderness preservation in 
national parks to focus on concerns such as resource depletion, pollution, the dangers of 
nuclear power, and strategies to combat these and other problems at the state and federal 
levels.3 
The American experience with energy prior to the oil crisis of 1 973 involved a 
"single-source mentality" connected to a sense of time value. Americans preferred 
energy sources and methods that appeared to save time and money. Over the decades, 
reliance on a single source came under this sense of value and time. It was easier and less 
expensive to develop utilities that generally relied on one source of energy-- oil. A 
mythic past suggested bountiful, seemingly inexhaustible resources, and the relationship 
between single-source energy consumption and economic growth became a lasting legacy. 
The crisis, coupled with the nation's growing environmental awareness, illustrated that 
energy was itself an extension of nature. In dealing with energy, one dealt with nature 
itself. The relationship was a reciprocal one. Environment determined energy usage, 
and energy usage affected the environment. 4 
3 James C. Williams, Energy and the Making of Modem California (Akron: University of Akron 
Press, 1997), 1. 
4 Ibid., 2-4. 
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In addition to the maturation of the environmental movement and the oil crisis of 
the 1970s, an emerging trend that saw urban space as an environment meriting protection 
pushed concepts and strategies beyond the older rhetoric of wilderness preservation. In 
the past, Americans had viewed urbanity as the antithesis of nature. Such ideas 
permeated Progressive-era conservation policies, for example. By the 1960s, modem 
urban studies and changing environmental attitudes increasingly rejected such ideas in an 
effort to better understand the "nature" of urban environments and to remove the 
numerous ills that plagued them. After all the United States was, and had been since the 
1920s, a predominantly urban nation. In the 1960s and 1970s, many environmentalists 
pursued new aims with new methods. With respect to cities, they hoped to limit 
. . . 
growth, remove inefficiencies in utilities, �epair the infrastructure, clean the air and water, 
and create permanent governmental apparatuses for dealing with such problems. This 
multifaceted environmental movement, primarily made up of middle-class citizens, led to 
federal and state regulations regarding air and water quality.5 The perception of urban 
space as an environment and connections between the environment and nature meant that 
environmentalists need to reconsider cities.6 "Environmental problem solving-- usually 
involving technological development, policy, and implementation," and new ideas of what 
' Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation 
Movement, 1890-1920 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 1-5; Eric H. Monkonnen, America 
Becomes Urban: The Development of U.S. Cities and Towns (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1988), 1-9. ;  and Rothman, The Greening of America?, 2-3. 
6 President Carter, quoted in Jeanne Nienaber Clarke and Hanna J. Cortner, eds., The State and 
Nature, 1. 
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constituted the environment shaped t�e �ay Americans perceived energy.7 The old 
perspective that linked energy and economics still lingered, but now the environment was 
irrevocably connected to the equation. 
Around this time, citizens of Knoxville, Tennessee began to reexplore their city's 
role in the national and international communities. Feeling the effects of industrial 
decline, suburban flight, and downtown deterioration, Knoxvillians sought a new urban 
identity amidst the national oil crisis and soon emphasized two potentially interrelated 
solutions: a world's fair with a theme of energy and environmentalism. These ideas 
would mark Knoxville as one of the most progressive cities in the nation. Although 
seemingly born of the oil crisis, this notion also had antecedents in the optimism of 
postwar America. The "sense that all problems could be solved by the application of 
money and ingenuity and its fervent belief that individuals and their desires could make a 
difference in a technological society."8 And Knoxville was not unique in its new vision. 
Out of necessity, California had shifted to a new energy policy. California's 
"rediscovery of solar energy, wind power, minihydro, biomass energy, and cogenerated 
energy" became a model for the rest of America.9 California's mixed use of resources 
seemed to suggest that finances, innovation, and motivation could solve energy and 
environmental problems, albeit perhaps temporarily. Traveling the same road, Knoxville 
7 Joel A. Tarr, The Search for the Ultimate Sink: Urban Pollution in Historical Perspective 
(Akron: University of Akron Press, 1998), 1. 
8 Rothman, The Greening of America?, 3 .  
9 Williams, Energy and the Making of Modern California, 1 1. Recent energy crises suggest, 
however, that California has yet to resolve all issues in this area. For example, see Los Angeles Times, 9 
April 2003. 
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explored alternate visions of itself in the 1970s and 1980s by developing the rarely 
explored connections between urban renewal, environmental concerns, and energy. 
In addition to the national concerns with environment and energy, Knoxvillians 
had other reasons to present their city as a natural choice for a seat of energy 
development. Knoxville lies at the ce�ter of a region that boasts the largest national park 
( the Great Smoky Mountains National Park), the largest power supplier in the 
southeastern United States (TV A), a major research institution (the University of 
Tennessee), and a government-funded research community associated with atomic power 
(ORNL). Its location gave the claim that Knoxville was an energy center some 
credibility. And initially, it seemed enough for some Knoxvillians to posit their 
community as an energy center merely because it was a seat for the production of energy. 
It also seemed reasonable to co-opt the environmental movement by simply implying 
shared sentiments and emphasizing the city's proximity to the Great Smoky Mountains 
National Park. These manipulations and assertions were enough to carry Knoxvillians to 
the idea of the Expo itself, but additional work was needed to legitimate the claim. 
Citizens' committees, the Metropolitan Planning Commission, state and federal agencies, 
including the Energy Department, and the local media performed these other tasks. 
The media, primarily the newspapers, created the least accurate, but the most 
accessible basis for legitimation. Associating energy usage and technology with the 
environment and treating the city as natural space, the media made "energy" a household 
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word around Knoxville and gave it fresh definitions . These new meanings tended to be 
narrow and limiting, but nevertheless prompted more Knoxvillians than ever before to 
think about their environment in a variety of circumstances. Upon the Bureau of 
International Expositions' approval of the KIEE proposal, Tennessee Senator James 
Sasser commented in the Knoxville News-Sentinel that 
Knoxville and Tennessee is a natural setting for an international exposition. It is the 
home of TV A, the greatest public power project in the world, and people have been 
visiting it for years. Oak Ridge is right down the road, and we are looking to it to solve 
our energy problems. If the exposition is accepted by the people of Knoxville, it will be 
a great economic boost for all of East Tennessee and a great leap forward for Knoxville. 1 0  
The U.S. Department of Commerce echoed this sentiment, stating how economically 
positive the fair would be for Kn�xvillians and how Knoxville would_ gain "prominence 
and recognition for its energy related facilities."1 1  The media tied the environment, 
energy, and economics together rhetorically; Expo '�2, its _promoters hoped, would give 
those ties physical reality. 
Propaganda concerning the fair moved beyond simply asserting that the exposition 
would "help dispel the darkness surrounding the energy crisis."1 2  Local participants 
planned to use research and education to shine a new light. The fair provided a "setting 
in which to explore new technologies to conserve energy, to harness the long-lasting and 
most renewable resources, and to carry on the search for new resources." 1 3  Yet the fair's 
message was rarely any clearer than that. Occasionally, concrete examples seeped into 
'
0 Knoxville News-Sentinel, 27 April 1977. 
I I  Ibid. 
1 2  New York Times, 10 June 1982. 
13 New York Times, 15 February 1981. 
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the press coverage, but information on fusion at ORNL, coal-gasification at TV A, the 
innovative new Zoological Park Reptile House, or the University's solar energy studies 
rarely involved any integration into fair activities. 14  The U.S. exhibit became a 
compromise between Jimmy Carter's preference for efficiency, conservation, and solar 
energy and Ronald Reagan's predilection for all things nuclear. Thus, the confusion in 
Knoxville's exposition mirrored the mixed messages in federal programs concerning 
energy. 1 5  
The propaganda for the fair also yielded varied definitions of the terms 
"environment" and "energy." Environment came to mean a better physical space, while 
retaining its more mainstream "green" associations. Because of such associations, the 
beautification of downtown Knoxville became an avenue to environmentalism. 1 6  
Environment also referred to "green" policies: conservation, preservation, protection, 
restoration, renewal, degradation, decline, and citizen initiative. Others associated 
environment with the natural resources that provided energy and supported the 
economy. 17  The main definition of energy still revolved around fuel, but the media also 
celebrated the enthusiasm of the citizenry as perhaps Knoxville's most valuable energy 
source. Buzzwords for the fair implied a focus on conservation and energy alternatives 
14 Betsey B. Creekmore, Knoxville--Our Fair City (Knoxville : Greater Knoxville Chamber of 
Commerce, 1984), 36-37. 
1 5  New York Times, 2 May 1982. 
16 Knoxville News-Sentinel, 4 May, 1977. 
11 Knoxville News-Sentinel, 29 April, 1977. 
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for the sake of people_ and the environment. 1 8  International symposia preceded the fair 
and emphasized energy's connection to economics, politics, and global balances of power. 
Symposia participants explored alternative energy sources and the effects of new 
technology on underdeveloped nations. 19  The fair promoters themselves offered yet 
another perspective on energy. By focusing on the history and the future of energy in 
American development, they avoided the unresolved tensions of the contemporary 
crises.20 
Critics �hallenged the fair' s rhetoric through the local media. At a University of 
Tennessee function, U.S. Senator Lowell Weicker of Connecticut argued that the city had 
no business sponsoring such an exposition until Knoxvillians made good on their ideas by 
adopting at least a basic energy policy. Weicker asserted that such a policy should 
include.plans for conservation, recycling, and a revamped public transportation system. 2 1  
The Knoxville Area Urban League (KAUL) questioned whether the effects of the fair 
could be so one-sidedly positive. Rapid growth, KA UL added, was not progress unless 
it addressed long-term sustainability. 22 Comments to the EIS pointed out shortcomings 
in both the short-term and long-term projected effects and attested to the unrealistic 
1 8 United States Travel Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Draft Environmental Impact 
Statement (Haworth: 1976), i. 
19 Knoxville News-Sentinel 29 April, 1977. 
20 United States Travel Service of the Department of Commerce, Supplement to the Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (Haworth: 1979), 13. 
21 Knoxville Journal, 18 October 1979. 
22 Knoxville Area Urban League, An Assessment of Socioeconomic Problems Likely to Result 
From the Proposed Knoxville International Energy Exposition (KAUL: 1977), 1-4. 
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nature and general inadequacy of the study. 23 Bob Allen, on behalf of the Harvey 
Broome Group of the Sierra Club, voiced concern that the EIS did not address the 
problems of a "crash program," which is what he termed the rapid growth of the fair site. 
Allen pointed out that all air quality data suggested a "planned violation of Federal Air 
Quality Standards."24 Bruce A. Halston, a UT geography professor, noted that the U.S._ 
Pavilion was essentially an "open ended box, in which air pollution could enter from the 
north and be trapped by the valley and the pavilion. "25 In the comments to the EIS and 
the local newspapers, Professor Joe Dodd criticized the rapidity of fair development, and 
questioned the plans for redevelopment.26 To these groups and individuals, the rhetoric 
and convoluted definitions did not wash. The dissenters had perceived a significant 
problem: such sloppy planning and the ambiguity surrounding the residual development 
of the site led to a lack of will on all sides. Defeated, the dissenters could not stop the 
fair, nor could they control its impact. The plans revealed a lack of realism, which in tum 
contributed to the lack of will. The promoters were not going beyond the rhetoric or the 
surface of the fair and its theme. This lack of will, concerning the environment, the fair, 
and the future of the community figured into the fair 's ultimate failure in accomplishing 
the promoter 's goals. 
A great deal of Expo rhetoric was exactly that, simply rhetoric, but there were 
23 United States Travel Service of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Comments and Responses 
to the Final Environmental Impact Statement (Haworth: 1 979), 5-1 1 ,  14-50. 
24 Ibid. ,  6. 
is Ibid., 9. 
26 Ibid., 1 7-36; Joe Dodd, Expose: the Real Stozy Behind the Knoxville World's Fair (Knoxville: 
Joe Dodd, 1 982), 2. 
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behind-the-scenes attempts by numerous citizens and groups to make Knoxville's new 
vision( s) real. Some of these attempts even predated fair planning. These explorations 
followed in the footsteps of seemingly more progressive locations, such as the state of 
California and the city of Portland, Oregon. The explorations reflected optimism, hope, 
and drive. Planned visions of Knoxville drew on the connections between energy, 
environment, and hopes for urban revitalization. In fact, new planners contrived to 
revitalize downtown Knoxville through the commodification of energy itself. 
As early as 1970, private citizens had articulated goals for downtown renewal and 
development. The Program for Community Improvement (PCI), for example, argued 
"that the haphazard methods of the past be abandoned in favor of a logical and 
coordinated plan of action based upon total community needs."·27 The program 
reco�ized that urban revitalization encompassed more than just downtown development; 
the study intended to spur social and economic action as well. The people involved 
with this study, private citizens generally residing in urbanized sectors, understood that 
the urban space was an environment. PCI viewed the city as habitat and strove to 
integrate commerce with residences and people with development. These plans offered 
a panacea for a declining industrial and commercial downtown. The main focus of the 
two-and-a-half year study was to eliminate and prevent slums, deterioration, and urban 
blight. Another goal was to bring residential life back to the central business district. 
27 Program for Community Improvement, Initial Program for Community Improvement: 1970-
1976 (Knoxville: 1970), 1. 
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Commerce, the report concluded, could not revive downtown alone; at the time, it was a 
place to work and little else. More diversified activities were needed.28 Moreover, 
because the PCI plan for renewal depended upon federal dollars and because the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development stipulated that fifty percent of any 
funded project be committed to housing for low and moderate income families, its 
promoters could not concentrate on predominantly industrial or commercial zones.29 
Finally, the PCl's plan called for mixed usage, an idea consistent with the planning 
recommendations espoused by the noted urban commentator Jane Jacobs.Jo Fort 
Sanders, Mechanicsville, and Old North Knoxville became top priorities because of their 
central locations and mixed-use potential.J i 
In addition to specific plans for various neighborhoods in the central Knoxville 
district that would be governed by municipal zoning laws, the PCI also called for public 
action and created a list of priorities and recommendations for the city and its citizens. 
Because of a shortage of housing for the elderly, the program members felt that the 
Knoxville Housing Authority should immediately apply for federal funding for three 
hundred units that provided the means for home ownership. Another proposal suggested 
training programs to teach tenants how to repair and maintain their residences. The 
committee felt instilling pride of ownership in public housing tenants would reap larger 
civic benefits, such as private rehabilitation. Cooperation between developers and 
21 Ibid., 1 -3 
29 Ibid., 4. 
30 Jacobs, The Death and Life of Great American Cities, 3-25. 
31 Program for Community Improvement, Initial Program for Community Improvement, 4- 12. 
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government was another strategy. Government funding was available for both public and 
private restoration of historically zoned neighborhoods such as Mechanicsville and Fort 
Sanders. Rehabilitation, defined by the PCI as the physical renovation of buildings, 
would revitalize declining neighborhoods. In addition, the program stressed the need for 
the elimination .of housing discrimination.32 The rest of the committee's program 
centered on avenues of action, providing information on zoning, building codes, 
information about government funding, and its stipulations. Clearly, this document 
treated the downtown sector as an organic whole and identified roles for multiple urban 
players. 
It appears, however, that the PCI proposal for mixed-use development was 
· · largely ignored because in 1972, Mayor Kyle Testerman commissioned a new study for 
central Knoxville -- "A Prospectus for Central Knoxville: A Conceptual Framework for 
the Development and Continued Growth of a New Community in the Heart of 
Knoxville." The Testerman study concentrated exclusively on the central business 
district, but its conclusions were strikingly similar to the PCI proposal. Testerman's 
task force concluded that mixed uses (housing, retail shopping, financial sectors, nightlife 
zones, light industrial activity, and offices) were essential elements of flourishing urban 
space. It called for more private development, but its goals and methods, such as 
integrated initiative and planning, were the same. 33 On a new note, more integrated 
. 
32 Ibid., 13-1 8 .  
3 3  Mayor's Downtown Task Force, A Prospectus for Central Knoxville: A Plannin� Study By the 
Mayor 's Downtown Task Force (Knoxville: 1972),1-9. 
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energy concepts emerged in the Testerman study. Working with the Knoxville Utilities 
Board (KUB), the plan called for integrated energy provision and a new infrastructural 
design for the downtown district. The project would more efficiently link downtown 
units with each other while energy would be supplied from one source at one lo�ation. 
By 1974 everyone knew this -- the UT report explained the impact of the energy 
crisis on the state. The most interesting conclusion of their study projected a continued 
reliance on oil, despite the fact that these planners foresaw the availability of other fuel 
sources by 1980. They anticipated that few Tennesseans would change their energy use 
patterns. The Tennessee State Planning Office's failure to pursue alternative sources 
seemed to confirm this •sentiment.34 Nonetheless, some Knoxvillians were already 
reconsidering their relationship with energy. As early as 1970, a pattern of well-· 
informed, well-intentioned planning emerged in Knoxville, albeit always on paper. By 
1977, planning included a more focused perspective that considered energy and the 
environment. The Energy Expo of '82 served as a new catalyst for new proposals, but 
these plans suffered the same paper fate as their predecessors. 
According to Wayne Blasius of the Metropolitan Planning Commission (MPC), 
the committee created by Kyle Testerman in 1 972, the initial thrust for energy planning 
came from the Energy Opportunities Consortium in 1977. It was the Consortium's 
sentiment that the city needed to adopt an energy plan in light of the energy-themed 
34 Tennessee State Planning Office, Impact of the Energy Crisis on the Tennessee Economy 
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee, 1974) 1 -3. 
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exposition. The MPC met with the Consortium to consider the proposal. 
Contemporaneously, the U.S. Department of Energy issued funding for the 
Comprehensive Community Energy Management Program. The program, essentially an 
inventory of Knoxville energy use followed by recommendations for reductions, paved 
the way for new ideas and programs concerning energy. With the prospect of federal 
dollars, energy planning became more attractive to Knoxville decision makers and the city 
soon received full funding for its government study.35 With this new ·study, a steering 
committee oversaw policy and approved energy objectives and a final plan. Five 
working committees addressed land use, buildings and structures, transportation, 
emergency contingency planning, and alternative energy sources in relation to energy 
consumption. 
A private firm, Hittman Associates, conducted the "energy inventory," or a 
profile of consumption in Knoxville. As a consequence of this inventory, the steering 
committee identified broad objectives that, in tum, revealed the inefficient use of energy 
across the city. The objectives were to "establish Knoxville as a recognized center for 
energy management, research, education, and action. "36 This plan, in conjunction with 
fair objectives and the urgency caused by the oil scarcity, was designed to ensure that 
Knoxville 's energy woes of the 1970s wo�ld never be duplicated. This plan, its creators 
argued, not only ensured a future free from energy vulnerability, but served as the 
35 Fred Metz, III, "The Local Government Energy Planning Process: Two comparative Case 
Studies and the Development of an Energy Planning Process Model for Local Government" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Tennessee, 1 983), 58-59. 
36 Ibid. , 6 1 -69. 
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springboard for the revitalization of Knoxville, both physically and in the national mind. 
The emphasis on contingency and emergency plans illustrated a desire to avoid at all costs 
a crisis such as the one that followed the oil embargo. The idea of a new urban identity 
grounded in energy matched a main goal of the fair, but in the end the vagueness of the 
plan, which failed to suggest mechanisms for implementation, revealed the halfheartedness 
of this and other efforts. Knoxville had failed to move beyond the rhetoric of the 
exposition's promoters and to craft a realistic energy plan that provided means of 
implementation or prescription. 37 
For example, members of the MPC and a private citizen committee addressed the 
development of alternative energy sources. Newly hired experts initially concluded that 
such alternatives should be made mandatory, but eventually, in the city's new energy 
plan, they became nothing more than unenforceable recommendations. The MPC 
recognized that Knoxvillians, like most Americans, were not prepared to make the 
substantial lifestyle changes that alternative energy sources entailed. And as the oi! crisis 
prompted by the OPEC embargo dissipated, so did the sense of urgency necessary to 
enforce legal prescriptions. The city, like the nation, remained dependent upon foreign 
oil, but it became less concerned about the consequences of that reliance38 
The inventory identified energy uses in residences, transportation, commercial 
facilities, industry, public schools, and municipal institutions.39 Knoxville's output 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid., 72-74. 
39 Knoxville/Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission, Community Energy Use Profile 
(Knoxville: 1980), 1 -4. 
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exceeded 79 trillion BTU's of energy, or about 14 million barrels of crude oil a year.40 
The profile allowed planners to "estimate existing and future energy supply and demand 
relationships" and resulted in "The Community Energy Action Plan."4 1  This plan 
addressed Knoxville's "formidable" energy issues in terms of economics and national 
security. The plan argued that reliance on foreign oil created vulnerability and 
undermined the economy on a local and national level. The importation of oil contributed 
to inflation. By buying energy outside the region, Knoxville spent money that could 
have been reinvested into the local economy. The plan also observed that the current 
means of producing e�ergy were increasingly expensive and posed "serious environmental 
and public safety problems.42 
Knoxville's energy woes were really no different than the rest of America's. In 
fact,· part of the reason for Knoxville 's inertia was that the city attempted to address the 
problems of a nation. Knoxville's answer to such questions mirrored the national 
response as well. And like America's perspective on the problem, the plans that emerged 
were mostly rhetorical in nature. Blind faith in technological innovation and the idea that 
"someone else" would take care of the energy predicament prevented alternative solutions 
from becoming a reality . Voluntary community action, without the means for 
enforcement, was destined to fail. The goals of the various plans for Knoxville were 
unrealistic and halfhearted at best. The Community Energy Action Plan emphasized 
40 Ibid., 1 
41 Ibid. 
42 Knoxville/Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission, Community Energy Action Plan 
(Knoxville: 1980), 1. 
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conservation and efficiency, for example, with strategies that included reducing the energy 
consumed in heating homes through improved building construction and the restoration of 
older structures. The study points out that this effect could also be achieved through the 
stricter enforcement of the existing Tennessee Energy Code with respect to building 
codes, but no officials did so. Another suggestion was that energy consumption involved 
in transportation might be lowered by carpooling, using public transit, biking, or walking, 
but provided no rewards for those who did so.43 The manual asserted that community-
wide education workshops focusing on energy would heighten awareness and reinforce 
individual responsibility.44 Waste-to-energy facilities would help recycle some energy in 
the community.45 "Various nontraditional forms of energy should be encouraged"-- but, 
of course, always privately.46 The plan included the municipal administration in 
education and incentive programs and it called for increased spending for transportation.47 
In the end, however, the expensive plan depended on voluntary action. The Energy 
Project adopted the plan, but neither the federal, state, nor local government allocated 
money for its implementation. As a consequence, the plan failed. Like its predecessors, 
the only potential energy generated by the Community Action Energy plan would come 
from burning .the paper on which it was written.48 
Concurrent with the Community Action Energy plan, the Metropolitan Planning 
43 lbid., 3-10. 
44 Ibid. ,  10-11. 
45 Ibid. ,  12. 
46 Ibid., 13. 
47 Ibid., 26-29. 
48 Metz, "The Local Government Energy Planning Process", 76. 
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Commission published the Federal Energy Conservation Program Inventory. This guide 
provided information on education programs, federal incentives, and local and federal 
agencies that could provide a multitude of services to interested citizenry. For instance, 
the handbook offered information on building codes.49 Although the handbook was to 
some degree helpful, the job of conservation and environmental awareness was still left to 
the individual citizen. Two years later the Metropolitan Planning Commission published 
another supplementary text, "The Impacts of Using Local Energy Supplies." This text 
analyzed the impact of local energy supply options in terms of their individual functions, 
costs, and relations to the local economy. This new handbook listed options such as 
solar water heaters, municipal solid waste incineration, water-to-air heat pumps, air-to-air 
heat pumps, and alternative vehicles fuels like alcohol, compressed natural gas, and 
electricity.50 Although more detailed than its predecessors, the handbook still failed to 
offer avenues of implementation and enforcement. Both plans from the MPC offered 
suggestions, but no realistic solutions because they depended solely upon privatized, 
voluntary action beyond the financial means and personal inclination of most local 
citizens. 
Contemporaneously with the Energy Project, Knoxville received additional federal 
funds to participate in an Integrated Community Energy System (ICES) study designed 
to assess the potential for such a system's implementation in Knoxville. ICES was an 
49 Knoxville/Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission, Federal Energy Conservation 
Program Inventozy (Knoxville: 1980), 1-3; 12-23. 
50 Knoxville/Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission, The Impact of Using Local 
Energy Supplies (Knoxville: 1982), 1 -9; 1 1 -39. 
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integrated, comprehensive plan designed to fulfill the total energy needs of a community. 
ICES was supposed to provide energy conservation by "incorporating innovative 
technologies, energy-conserving community designs, and financial and regulatory 
mechanisms that facilitate implementation."s t  ICES combined many energy techniques 
in order to produce an efficient, more earth-friendly mixed-use program that served an 
entire community. ICES relied primarily on coal and renewable or waste resources . It 
called for decreased fuel consumption, reserving nonrenewable resources such as oil, and 
recycling about 32 percent . of its energy. • The implementation would cost less than 
Knoxville then paid for energy and the maintenance of an energy infrastructure.52 Given 
Knoxvil le's supposed long-range goals concerning conservation and efficiency, ICES 
seemed perfect. The plan addressed Knoxville's problem of economic decline by 
importing less energy and keeping more local funds within the community. In addition, 
the adoption of such a plan fell directly into line with the energy goals of the fair, and 
clearly Knoxville had to adopt more than rhetoric to fully reap the residual benefits of the 
fair. TV A, however, proved to be the stumbling block to the ICES study. Entrenched 
TV A officials, resistant to changes that threatened their authority, claimed TV A systems 
were too vast to be refitted and they refused to cooperate. 53 Knoxville essentially 
squandered federal dollars in the undertaking of this study. That TV A was an obstacle 
was obvious, and the research done for ICES should have been seen as useless in the 
5 1 Knoxville/Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission, The Potential for Integrated 
Community Energy Systems (Knoxville: 1 978), 1 .  
5 2  
Ibid. , 2. 
53 Ibid., 2-8 ;32-35. 
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beginning. In order to appear more progressive, Knoxville had appropriated the study 
with no intention of challenging TV A's stronghold. Furthermore, no research even 
examined whether TV A could duplicate the ICES program. TV A provides energy in 
eastern Tennessee today in much the same way as it did in 1978. 
The last in a long line of plans to be excitedly funded involved the proposed 
Energy Research Center. Like the others, this plan never moved off the drawing board. 
The plan involved the residual use of the Lower Second Creek area, and it recommended 
that the U.S. Pavi�ion house a permanent Energy Research Center after Expo '82.54 The 
Center, to be owned by UT in cooperation with TVA and ORNL, involved seven centers · 
of research and eight special purpose laboraJories.55 The center focused on all energy 
studies, but gave particular emphasis to studies concerning new energy applications in 
industry. This center would establish Knoxville as the leader in energy innovation, the 
guide to worldwide development of sustainable lifestyles. According to its promoters, 
the center would "enable the separate and independent activities to be combined 
synergistically into a coherent, problem-focused program which transcends the traditional 
disciplinary barriers to rapid progress."56 The planning involved with the center was 
extensive. Greenways, walkways, and bike trails would surround it. The center itself 
would be a marvel of passive energy design, utilizin� solar energy and mixed-use systems. 
s4 Economics Research Associates, The Development Potential of Lower Second Creek 
(Knoxville: 1978), III-4. ss The Expo '82 Federal Pavilion residual Use Facility Program, Energy Research Center 
(Knoxville: 1978), 7-8. 
56 Ibid., 7. 
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Tree plantings across the city would provide a method for "micro-climate conditioning." 
Knoxville would become "the energy capital of the world" and a "city built in a forest. "57 
The idea of a permanent Energy Research Center was consistent with intellectual 
events such as the International Energy Symposiums held in preparation for the fair' s 
theme. The International Energy Symposia Series (IESS) intended to provide a forum for 
and a guideline to international discussions involving humankind's relationship to energy 
and its use. The 1980 Symposium, the first of three, sought to establish the nature and 
parameters of the energy crisis. Its organizers assumed that each nation faced a different 
crises based on its socioeconomic and political status in the international community. 
Participants at the _first symposium concluded that energy supply and demand must be 
considered in the context of a varied economic and political context, but systematic 
policies regulating energy consumption were essential to the global community.58 The 
second meeting in 198 1  discussed nuclear power and biomass energy. The symposium 
presented differing perspectives from developed and undeveloped countries and from 
market and nonmarket economies. Such presentations established the divergent energy 
needs and objectives that resulted from different levels of economic development. 59 The 
third session in 1 982, devoted to government policies for energy distribution and 
57 Knoxville/Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission, After Expo (Knoxville: 1 979), ii. 
58 Robert A. Bohm, Lillian A Clinard, and Mary R. English,eds., Toward An Efficient Energy 
Future: Proceedings of the International Energy Symposium I (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 198 1), vii-xi. 
59 Robert A. Bohm, Lillian A Clinard, and Mary R. English,eds., Toward An Efficient Energy 
Future: Proceedings of the International Energy Symposium II (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1982), vi-ix. 
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consumption, led to an agreement that the fifty participating nations would meet 
biannually to further their innovation and understanding. The symposia attempted to 
address energy crises and sustainability on a global scale. Although fueled by good 
intentions and filled with good ideas, they failed to accomplish anything concr�te. The 
meetings did not continue after the fair. Finally, funds for construction of the U.S. 
pavilion fell short. A temporary structure inappropriate for residual use appeared 
instead and the permanent Energy Research Center became little more than a remembered 
dream. Although an Energy Research Center does operate within the UT system 
currently, it is not the ambitious center that was planned. Knoxvillians could not, or 
would not, shoulder the costs of their ambitions.60 
· The concept of the Energy Research Center.J}ad centered exposition rhetoric, but 
. it too had failed. Its objectives--to advance energy innovation, increase global 
cooperation, and to renovate Knoxville--were the fair's objectives. To some extent, they 
were Knoxvillians' objectives. But Knoxvillians' visions of the future never matured 
past the planning process. Because of the oil crisis, plans for reducing energy usage and 
introducing alternative fuels had an urgency attached to them in the 1970s. By the time 
of the fair, this urgency had dissipated. 
The 1982 International Energy Exposition promised many effects. Only one was 
ever really accomplished--the fair itself. Knoxville's good intentions, exhibited in detailed 
60 Robert A. Bohm, Lillian A Clinard, and Mary R. English,eds. ,  Toward An Efficient Energy 
Future: Proceedings of the International Energy Symposium III (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing 
Company, 1983), vii-ix. 
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planning, proved unsustainable for many reasons. The plans mostly called upon private 
citizen action that made large-scale consensus difficult to achieve. The media 
disseminated rhetoric about energy, but rarely contemplated the very real changes that 
must accompany greater efficiency. Because local government never stood firmly behind 
the plans, there were no means for implementation or enforcement. Finally, the energy 
crisis appeared to be over by 1 982. Knoxvillians abandoned their halfhearted 





"History will judge us kindly. "1 
Optimism had marked the fair's opening day. Although just shy of the highest 
attendance targets, more than eighty thousand visitors made the scruffy little city seem as 
if it had accomplished its goals that day simply by hosting a World's Fair.2 Yet, by 
year's end, Knoxvillians had abandoned their other ambitions for the exposition. The fair 
ultimately did little more than deliver on promised interstate highway improvements. 
Instead, its legacy proved surprising; it had altered the tradition of development in 
Knoxville. 3 The fair, funded through government and nongovernment sources, began a 
trend toward privatized, satellite development of the downtown areas. Subsequent 
renovations, regardless of their overall success, illustrated a persistent lack of consensus 
concerning urban renewal in Knoxville and the apparent unwillingness of power brokers 
to seek consensus. 
Knoxville's flings with community energy programs and beautification gestures 
subsequent to the fair, coupled with the ultimate failure of residual development at the 
Lower Second Creek site, demonstrated that Knoxvillians did not agree on their city's 
identity. Furthermore, Knoxville's municipal structure did not provide the means for the 
1 The Knoxville Journal, 3 May 1982. Attributed to Mayor Randy Tyree at the opening 
ceremonies. 
2 Knoxville News-Sentinel, 2 May 1982. 
3 New York Times, 30 May, 1981; William Bruce Wheeler, Manuscript, 2003 : 170-173 . 
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implementation or enforcement of any approved plans.4 Citizens involved in 
purchasing, renovating, and restoring areas such as Fourth and Gill, Mechanicsville, Old 
North Knoxville, the Old City, Gay Street, and Market Square rejected consensus and 
rarely sought municipal approval beyond basic construction permits. Knoxvillians 
abandoned systemic, state-sponsored planning that addressed the needs of the whole 
community and instead transformed neighborhoods and urban satellite zones into 
privately owned, socially-restrictive residential and commercial sectors. This new type 
of development was a different beast. Prior to the fair, most city planning occurred 
through municipal channels with some input from community members. The fair, 
supposedly a part of that older tradition, became the agenda of an elite minority and the 
augury of future policies. This group of organizers, ranging from bankers, lawyers, and 
. developers, represented a new aristocracy. Development-minded, this small group of 
organizers cajoled, persuaded, and eventually forced the community to pay for the 
venture with both city and private funds. After the Exposition's failure to make good on 
its associated promises, Knoxvillians decided to take matters, and money, into their own 
hands. Privatized development in areas such as the Old City and Market Square, 
represented a change in traditional Knoxville urban development. The community was 
4 For more information concerning various development plans, see: The Mayor's Downtown Task 
Force, Prospectus for Central Knoxville: A Conceptual Framework for the Development and Continued 
Growth of a New Community in the Heart of Knoxville, August, 1972; Knoxville/Knox County 
Metropolitan Planning Commission, The Potential for Integrated Community Energy Systems 
June, 1980; Knoxville/Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission, Community Energy Action 
Plan, 1980; Knoxville/Knox County Metropolitan Planning Commission, After Expo, Prepared by the 
Regional/Urban Design Assistance Team, March, 1979. These are by far not the only examples of plans 
that failed, but are the ones chiefly targeted by the author. 
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not consulted. 5 
The same can be said of the local environmental movement, at least as it pertained 
to energy usage. The high hopes the fair engendered were no longer feasible in a city 
without lines at the gas pumps--a city that lacked the means and the will to pursue 
permanent conservation plans.6 In this pattern, it mirrored the nation. Knoxville was 
not some aberrant villain. The crisis had seemingly abated. In the midst of the 1980s oil 
glut, Americans forgot their past energy troubles. What seemed a pressing issue in 1976 
was no longer a grave concern. 
Promoters of the fair had dealt deftly with this unexpected twist for six months in 
1982, claiming they offered a timely reminder to a nation that had forgotten its previous 
woes and their possible return. They reminded the visitors of the dangers of dependence 
on foreign oil. Yet the lack of consensus exhibited in urban planning in Knoxville 
duplicated underlying problems in the fair. Pavilions presented mixed messages about 
the future of energy, reflecting the federal government's confusion concerning the issue as 
well, particularly with the shift in presidential administrations.7 The fair promoters 
sought to capitalize on environmental concerns, but much of their rhetoric was unrealistic. 
Knoxville tried to exploit its proximity to the TV A and ORNL, but its planners and 
promoters never developed true partnerships with these entities to ensure cleaner, more 
efficient, less expensive energy sources. 
5Knoxville Community Improvement Program. Initial Pro�ram for Community Improvement, 
1970-1976. Knoxville: November, 1970. 
6 Knoxville News-Sentinel, 2 May 1982. 
7 New York Times, 2 May 1982; see also The Knoxville Journal, 3 May 1982. 
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The confusion of the fair's theme came as no surprise, given the myriad uses of 
terms such as environment, energy, and green. The meaning of energy varied greatly, 
alternately referring to resources such as oil, coal, water, nuclear power, and even the 
enthusiasm of Knoxvillians and fair participants. Environment represented both 
physical space, whether it be on a community, national, or global level, and a "green" 
nature to be preserved or conserved. Given the competing definitions, incomplete goals, 
and inadequate long-term planning, it is little surprise that the fair failed to correct 
Knoxville's urban ills. An identity was never clearly formulated; thus, an identity never 
truly emerged. 
Instead, Knoxville has earned a rather hodgepodge reputation, stemming from the 
exposition experience and subsequent private developments. Although citizens have 
done a great deal to renovate sectors of the downtown area, no integrated whole has 
resulted. Knoxville's urban "center" is composed of four discrete, disconnected urban 
zones. This partitioning, a trend begun by Expo '82, renders the central business district 
of Knoxville static; Knoxville's "systems" function neither interdependently nor as a 
whole. 8 In fact, the systems hardly function at all. 
Haphazard, shortsighted development in Knoxville ha� become one of the most 
lasting legacies of the 1982 International Energy Exposition. The exposition, whic);i 
promised fifty years of progress in five, failed in almost every way.9 And while the 
federal government developed highways as promised, even those roads proved 
8 Ibid. 
9 Dodd, Expose, 1 .  
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detrimental because they exacerbated downtown fragmentation. In the end, the 
promoters ' broken promises cost the city of Knoxville some $32 million. 10  
Jake Butcher, the exposition's chairman, had announced in the opening ceremony 
that "today you can see that we 've brought in the harvest. .. A year ago this land was 
blighted. Today it is transformed."1 1  This statement reflected what Knoxvillians hoped 
the fair had achieved on a community level. Ultimately, such desires went unfulfilled. 
Just two years later, the New York Times assessed the exposition site as "the desolate 
legacy of the Knoxville 's World's Fair." All that remained was the Sunsphere and, 
perhaps symbolic o( the fair' s empty promises, it housed nothing. As Joe Dodd put it, 
"in terms of what the promoters promised it would do for Knoxville, the fair can only be 
described as a bust."12  The "scruffy little city did it," buf it was questionable what the 
scruffy little city actually did. 1 3  Sadly, history has not treated the 1982 World's Fair so 
kindly after all. 
10 New York Times, 1 November 1982. 
1 1  Knoxville News-Sentinel, 2 May 1982. 
12  New York Times, 1 8  May 1984; Ibid. 
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